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Altruism Spillovers:   
Are Behaviors in Context-Free Experiments  
Predictive of Altruism Toward a Naturally Occurring Public Good? 
 
 
 
A common criticism of using experiments to test economic hypotheses is that the 
laboratory environment is so sterile as to lose its relevancy for more complex “naturally 
occurring” markets and behaviors. For example, experiments investigating the characteristics of 
altruism in the voluntary provision of public goods typically use induced-values with neutral-
contexts in which lab contributions to the “public good” are framed as an “investment” decision, 
with the internal and external benefits specified, rather than as a “contribution” decision.  
Because the external validity of this type of experiment has not been addressed, the question 
remains: are decisions that are made in the sterile lab environment using tokens, anonymous 
partners, and benefits that only accrue to a small number of subjects (those who are in the 
experiment concurrently) predictive of altruistic behavior toward naturally-occurring public 
goods that involve benefits that accrue to the general public? 
We address this issue directly by conducting two related experiments.  First, we conduct 
a context-free laboratory public goods experiment that is used to estimate the level of altruism 
exhibited by each subject.  Subjects are paid their earnings from these induced-value 
experiments, and a follow-up experiment is immediately conducted in which subjects are given 
the opportunity to contribute to a naturally-occurring local public good.  Contributions to this 
local public good can be made in cash (either from money brought into the lab or experiment-
earnings) or paid by check.  To address potential ordering effects, we also reverse the sequence 
of the experiments, allowing subjects to contribute to the local public good first, followed by the 
context-free laboratory public goods. 
Our experimental design allows us to examine whether those individuals who are 
estimated to be more altruistic in the context-free environment are also more likely to contribute 
to a naturally-occurring public good – i.e.,  to test for altruism spillovers.1  Results indicate that 
altruistic behavior in the lab can be predictive of contributions to naturally occurring public 
                                                 
1 Our use of the phrase “altruism spillovers” is related to the use of the phrase “rationality spillovers” by Cherry et. 
al (2003), who examine whether or not rational behavior induced in market settings can spillover and result in 
subjects behaving more rationally in non-market valuation settings. 
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goods, but not in a uniform manner.  While there is some degree of correlation between some 
simple, non-parametric measures of altruism estimated with the induced-value lab game (such as 
average tokens contributed across rounds) and the likelihood of exhibiting altruistic behavior 
toward the naturally occurring public good, other non-parametric measures are inconsistent with 
our priors.  For instance, the more often a subject acts as a weak free-rider in the induced-value 
public goods game, the more likely she is to contribute to the naturally occurring public good.  
Furthermore, as describe in Section IV, our parametric estimates of altruism do a poor job of 
predicting giving to the naturally-occurring public good. 
The next section presents the experimental design.  Section III provides a parametric 
model that formally incorporates altruism and error in the public goods decision.  Results follow 
in Section IV. The final section concludes. 
 
II. Experimental Design 
 Two treatments are conducted with a total of 193 subjects.  In “base treatment,” subjects 
first participated in an induced-value, context-free, public-good experiment.  Next, an 
experiment was conducted in which subjects were given the opportunity to contribute to a 
naturally-occurring local public good.  In this treatment, there were 125 subjects participating in 
10 experimental sessions.2  In the reverse order treatment, an additional 68 subjects in 4 
experimental sessions participated in the contribution experiment first, followed by the induced 
value experiments.  We describe each component of these experiments in turn next.  Experiment 
instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
 
Laboratory Public Goods Experiment 
The design for the laboratory experiment follows that of Goeree et al. (2002a).  Subjects 
are given an endowment of tokens and must chose how many of these tokens to “keep” and how 
many to “invest” in a public good.  Each token kept earns a return only to the person who keeps 
it.  A token invested earns a return to the person making the investment and to all others in this 
person’s group.  The return to a token invested may not be the same for all.  For example, in one 
                                                 
2 There were an additional 3 subjects who participated in the base induced-value experiments, but could not be 
included in our analysis because they did not complete the portion of the experiment involving the naturally 
occurring public good.  These subjects are also not included in the analysis of the induced-value experiments for 
consistency. 
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treatment used in this experiment, a token kept earned 5-cents.  A token invested earned an 
“internal return” of 4-cents to the individual making the investment and an “external return” of 
2-cents to each of the three other people in the group.  
In this framework, individual i’s earnings in decision t are calculated as 
 ( ) ,it it it i it e ji jE v X x m x m x≠= − + + ∑  (1) 
where v is the value of a token kept, Xit is the individual i’s token endowment in decision t, xit is 
individual i’s contribution (or investment) to the public good in decision t, mi  is the internal 
return from one’s own contribution, and me is the external return from the sum of all others’ 
contributions. 
In this experiment, each subject made an investment decision under a number of 
treatment conditions.  Group size, internal return to the person contributing the tokens, and 
external return to all others in the group were varied between each treatment.  All choices were 
presented to the subject at one time, with the order of presentation varied between subjects.  A 
subject was able to complete the decisions in any order and change any decisions until they were 
all submitted.   Half of the 128 subjects completed the same 10 decisions as those reported in 
Goeree et al. (2002a). In these sessions group size was either 2 or 4, a token kept earned 5-cents, 
and a token contributed earned either 2-cents or 4-cents to the person contributing it, and the 
external return to each other person in the group was 2-cents, 4-cents, 6-cents, or 12-cents.  In 
order to test the robustness of our results we conducted additional sessions that included more 
variation in group size (2, 4, or 8) and higher per-token earnings.  In these sessions, a token kept 
earned 10-cents; a token contributed earned either 4 or 8 cents; the external return to each other 
person in the group was 4-cents, 8-cents, or 12-cents.  All remaining subjects made decisions 
under these treatments. 
Subjects were paid for this experiment before the next experiment was conducted.  
Average earnings in the base treatment were $38.35, with a range of $23.20 to $59.02.3  Average 
earnings in the reverse-order treatment were $35.37, with a range of $28.50 to $43.82.  Results 
from these experiments are discussed more fully in Section III. 
 
                                                 
3 After participating in the one-shot public goods experiment, subjects then participated in a repeated public-goods 
experiment.  Earnings are the sum of earnings from both the one-shot and repeated experiment.  The effect of their 
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Local Public Good Experiment 
In the base treatment, after subjects were paid for the laboratory public goods experiment, 
they were then given instructions for a choice-experiment involving the naturally-occurring 
public good; subjects were explicitly told that they would not have the opportunity to earn more 
money in this part of the experiment.  In the reverse-order treatment, subjects participated in the 
choice-experiment involving the naturally-occurring public good first.  Subjects were told that 
this part of the experimental session was unlike the rest of the session in that they would not have 
the opportunity to earn money in this part of the experiment. 
The format of the choice experiment follows a standard choice-modeling (conjoint) 
format that is commonly used to elicit values for non-marketed, public goods (see Holmes and 
Adamowicz 2003 and Hanley et al. 1998 for a discussion of choice experiments and their use in 
valuation of environmental goods).  Briefly, in a choice experiment, subjects are asked to choose 
between different bundles of goods.  The goods are described in terms of their characteristics, 
and the characteristics (one of which is price) vary across the bundles.  For example, a subject 
may be asked to consider a choice over two computers, each with different levels of 
characteristics (e.g., differing in storage capacity, memory, and monitor size) and with different 
prices.  By observing the tradeoffs made between computer characteristics and the cost of the 
computer, one can infer the marginal value of the computer attributes.  The logic follows for 
public goods in which the characteristics of the public good are varied and the “price” of the 
public good varies with its attributes.4 
In our choice experiment, subjects are given the opportunity to contribute to a naturally 
occurring local public good. The public good chosen must have the following characteristics.  
First, it must be “deliverable.”  If subjects were to choose to purchase “the good,” it must be 
credible that it could actually be provided in return for their payment.  Second, the good must be 
divisible in provision.  Subjects must be able to connect their specific payment with a specific 
amount of the public good provided (this rule may be relaxed, but for acceptability of the survey 
                                                                                                                                                             
experience in the repeated experiment (in particular, their contributions relative to others in their cohort) for the base 
treatment is captured in our parametric models by a measure of subjects’ earnings relative to those in their group. 
4 Public good choice experiments often involve hypothetical situations and hypothetical choices in which subjects 
are often confronted with a tax-price for the public good (e.g., increased taxes to provide increased services at 
national parks).  Other payment vehicles are plausible, such as variations in entry or license fees required to use the 
public good. 
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instruments we feel it is important).  Third, we must be able to alter the attributes of the public 
good and still be able to provide or deliver any combination of the attributes we offer to subjects. 
 The public good we offered subjects that satisfied the above criteria was planting shade 
trees in an urban area.  More specifically, we used Trees Atlanta’s “gift trees” program.  Trees 
Atlanta is a local non-profit organization that seeks to protect the Atlanta metropolitan 
environment by planting and conserving trees.  It focuses on planting and maintaining trees in 
downtown Atlanta, which is ranked among cities having the least downtown tree cover.  The 
lack of trees, along with increased asphalt and reflective buildings has contributed to an 8-10 
degree increase in downtown Atlanta summer temperatures since 1970.  Trees Atlanta seeks to 
alleviate this “urban heat-island” effect through the planting and maintaining of trees in the 
downtown area.  The organization will plant a tree in the metro-area for a contribution to their 
gift-trees program.  Each donation leads directly to the planting of a tree during the current 
planting cycle (from October through April each year). 
 There are three possible trees that subjects could choose to have planted: an Oak, 
Dogwood, or Crepe Myrtle.  Further, each tree could be planted in one of two sizes: a small tree 
(5-feet) or a medium tree (8-feet).  The cost to the subject for having a tree planted varied 
between $8 and $26.5  Subjects did not know the actual cost of tree planting and were only told, 
 
For Trees Atlanta to plant a tree, you will need to make a contribution.  The 
amount of a contribution ranges from $8 to $26 per tree and varies by the size and 
type of tree.  Each contribution leads to a tree being planted that would not have 
been planted otherwise. 
 
The choice of trees results in an experimental design with two attributes (apart from cost): type 
of tree, which has three “levels” (crepe myrtle, dogwood, oak) and tree size, which has two 
levels (small or medium).  An orthogonal fractional factorial experimental design was selected 
from Sloane (2004) to develop 36 choice questions (or choice sets).  The design was modified so 
that there was a correlation between size and cost (medium sized trees cost more than small 
trees), but orthogonality between all three attributes was maintained.  Each choice question 
                                                 
5 The cost could be $8, $12, $15, $19, $22 or $26.  The cost of planting trees as subjects saw them were allocated 
through the process of developing an orthogonal attribute design for the survey. 
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presents the subject with a decision to purchase one of two trees that differ by tree-type, size, 
and/or cost.  The subjects are also given the option to purchase neither tree in each question.  To 
illustrate, a sample choice question is presented below.  A color photograph of each tree at 
maturity is also presented to subjects in the column “Type of Tree” in the actual experimental 
questions. 
 
Suppose Option A and B are the only two available, which do you choose, if any? 
 Cost Type of Tree Size at Planting 
Option A: $19 Dogwood Medium (8 feet) 
Option B: $12 Oak Small (5 feet) 
 
I choose the following option (please check one box only): 
□  I choose to contribute $19 to have the tree planted in Option A. 
□  I choose to contribute $12 to have the tree planted in Option B. 
□  I will not contribute, and neither tree will be planted. 
 
 
 
Of the 36 choice questions, 4 combinations were implausible.  For example, there were 
combinations in which there were two identical trees offered for different prices.  The 32 
plausible combinations were split into four different questionnaires, each containing eight 
questions.  Each subject is presented with only one of the four questionnaires and thus answers 8 
choice questions. 
 The design for this portion of the experiment was as follows.  Subjects were given an 
experiment packet that contained the instructions, the eight choice questions, and a demographic 
survey.  Subjects read the instructions as the experimenter read them aloud.  First, Trees Atlanta 
was introduced to subjects, and its effort to increase tree cover in Atlanta was described.  The 
“Gift Trees” program was introduced, and a table shown to subjects that described each of the 
three trees that could be planted and a few of the important characteristics of each tree.  The 
attributes of the trees that were described are flowering habit, mature height, growth rate (years 
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to reach maturity), and shade potential.  Color photographs of each tree type (at maturity) were 
also shown to subjects. 
 After describing the good, the choice questions were introduced.  Subjects were told that 
they would answer eight questions in which they could choose one of three options: the option to 
purchase one of two trees, or the option to purchase neither tree.  A sample question was then 
provided, and the experimenter described in detail what it would mean if they checked the first 
option, the second option, or the third option (which was always the option not to purchase either 
tree). 
Subjects were then told how contributions would work.  To determine which tree, if any, 
is planted as a result of their contribution, one of the eight questions would be drawn at random 
to be the “binding” question.  By randomly choosing one question to be binding, we avoid 
sequencing effects in the choice questions.  If a subject chose a tree in the binding question, the 
subject then paid the specified cost for the tree, received a receipt for the payment, and that 
specific tree was planted by Trees Atlanta.  Subjects who chose to purchase a tree also completed 
a form (which could not be matched to their experiment ID number) that was given to Trees 
Atlanta with their name and mailing address so Trees Atlanta could mail a confirmation directly 
to the subject when the tree had been planted.  Finally, all subjects completed a demographic 
survey.6 
 
III. Measuring Altruism in Context-free Environments 
 We are interested in whether altruistic behavior in the context-free environment is 
predictive of contributions to the naturally-occurring local public good.  We consider three ways 
to model altruistic behavior in the context-free experiments, varying from very simple measures 
summarizing overall behavior across treatments to more complicated parametric models that 
formally incorporate altruism and noisy decision-making.  Each of these is explained in turn 
below, with summary results presented for each measure. 
 
 Nonparametric Measures: Average Contributions 
                                                 
6 In the reverse-order treatment, the demographic survey was completed at the end of the experimental session rather 
than at the end of the choice-experiment to avoid potential confounds associated with being asked attitudinal and 
personal information prior to being in the induced-value public goods experiments. 
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Perhaps the simplest way to summarize a subject’s behavior in the context-free 
experiment is simply to compute the average number of tokens contributed across decisions.  
Because endowments varied across treatments, we compute the average percentage of each 
subject’s endowment contributed in each decision: 
 
1
,
T it
t
it
x
X
T
=
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑
 (2) 
where xit is individual i’s contribution in decision t, Xit is the individual’s token endowment in 
decision t, and T is the total number of decisions made by individual i. 
 In the base treatment and reverse-order treatment, subjects contributed an average of 27 
and 29 percent of their endowment across decisions, respectively.  The mean and variance of the 
average contributions is not significantly different across the two treatments.  Considering each 
subject separately, Figure 1 displays a histogram of the average contribution (across all 
decisions) made by each individual in both treatments.  The minimum average contribution was 
0 percent of their endowment (29 subjects contributed nothing in all decisions), and the 
maximum average contribution was 92 percent of the endowment.  As in previous public goods 
experiments, positive contributions are commonly observed, but few subjects (less than 20 
percent of the total subject pool) contributed more than 50 percent of their endowment across 
decisions. 
 
 Nonparametric Measures: Strong and Weak Free-riding Behavior 
 Although average contributions are a simple, commonly reported summary measure of 
decision-making in public goods experiments, it may mask important differences in decision-
making across subjects and across decisions.  For instance, consider two subjects both with an 
endowment of 100 tokens in each of four decisions.  Suppose subject-1 contributes 25 tokens in 
each decision, and subject-2 contributes 0 tokens in 3 decisions and 100 tokens in the 4th 
decision.  Both subjects contributed 25 percent of their endowment on average.  However, the 
behavioral motives underlying these two subjects’ observed contributions could be very different 
(this point is discussed more fully below). 
In order to address this concern, we have created two summary measures that better 
reflect the heterogeneity of contributions across decisions.  First, we calculate the percentage of 
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decisions in which a given subject behaved as a strong free-rider (i.e., contributed nothing).  The 
second measure uses the percentage of decisions in which the subject behaved as weak free-rider 
(i.e., contributed more than 0 tokens, but less than 30% of their endowment).7 
 The strong and weak free-rider measures better reflect differences in contribution 
decisions compared to the subject’s average contribution across all rounds.  For example, 
consider the two subjects in the example above.  Both contribute an average of 25 percent of 
their endowment across decisions; however they are categorized very differently using the new 
weak and strong free-rider measures.  Subject-1 is categorized as a weak free-rider in 100% of 
the decisions and a strong free-rider in 0% of the decisions.  Subject-2, on the other hand, would 
be categorized as a strong free rider in 75% of the decisions, and a weak free-rider in 0% of the 
decisions. 
 Averaging across all subjects in the context-free experiments, subjects in the base and 
reverse-order treatments behaved as strong free-riders in 32.3 and 27.8 percent of their decisions, 
respectively.  Similarly, on average across subjects in the base and reverse-order treatments, they 
behaved as weak free-riders in 31.7 and 33.7 percent of their decisions, respectively.  Again, the 
mean behavior is not significantly different across treatments.  While the average behavior is 
similar between weak and strong free-riding, the distribution across subjects is rather different.  
The top panel of Figure 2 presents a histogram that shows the frequency with which each subject 
behaved as a strong free-rider (subjects from both treatments are pooled in Figure 2).  Forty 
percent of subjects did not behave as a strong free-rider in any decision.  At the other extreme, 15 
percent of subjects acted as a strong free-rider in all decisions.  The bottom panel of Figure 2 
presents corresponding information for weak free-riding behavior.  Less than 30 percent of 
subjects never behaved as a weak free rider, while only 5 percent of subjects always acted as a 
weak free-rider. 
 
 Parametric Models:  Incorporating Altruism and Noisy Decision Making 
                                                 
7 Isaac and Walker (1988) defined a “strong free-rider” as one who contributed less than 30 percent of their 
endowment.  We wanted to distinguish between perfect-Nash players and those who contributed a low number of 
tokens; therefore we kept Isaac and Walker’s cut-off contribution level but made a distinction between those who 
contributed nothing (“strong free-rider” in this paper) and those who contributed a positive amount, but less than 30 
percent (“weak free-rider” in this paper). 
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The summary statistics created thus far have the advantage that they do not require 
restrictive assumptions regarding motivations for contributing or the parametric form that 
preferences take.  They simply summarize the observed behavior.  However, they do not 
distinguish between warm-glow giving (utility is based on the act of contributing independent of 
the benefit others receive from the contribution; see Andreoni 1990, Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997, 
and Goeree et al. 2002a) and altruism based on the benefit that others receive.  Because subjects 
faced different parameters in each decision (i.e., group size, internal and external returns from a 
token contributed), differences in contributions between treatments yield important information 
about the underlying motives for contributions. 
Again, consider the two subjects described above.  Suppose the external return to a token 
contributed was constant in the first three decisions, but increased substantially in the fourth 
decision.  Because subject-1 contributes the same amount, no matter the external benefit, this 
subject’s behavior might best be described by a model of “warm-glow giving.” Subject-2, on the 
other hand, responds to the change in the external benefit. As such, this behavior is more 
consistent with altruistic giving.  We examine this idea using a formal model of altruistic 
preferences. 
The most common specification of altruism assumes that one’s utility is a linear function 
of own-earnings and others’ earnings (see Holt and Laury 2004 for a survey of other theoretical 
explanations of contributions). This is specified as 
 ,i i i jj iU E Eα ≠= + ∑  (3) 
where Ui represents the utility of subject i, Ei represents own earnings as defined by (1), and iα is 
interpreted as an altruism parameter that determines the weight subject i places on others’ 
earnings.8  
If the altruism parameter is set equal to zero, the model reduces to the standard game 
theoretic model: the subject acts as a Nash player and maximizes own earnings only.   If αi is 
positive in equation (3), this indicates that an individual values both one’s own earnings and the 
earnings of others in the group.  In this case, increasing the external benefit of a contribution or 
increasing the number of others in the group who will benefit from a contribution should 
                                                 
8 Other specifications could include non-linear functions of own and others’ earnings. 
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increase contributions.  On the other hand, a negative estimate for iα indicates an individual’s 
utility is decreased when the earnings of others are increased. 
An important feature of the linear altruism specification is that it predicts an all-or-
nothing contribution decision. According to this model, a subject will compare the marginal cost 
of contributing with the marginal benefit to all in the group to determine whether or not to 
contribute one’s full endowment.  In other words, a person will contribute fully if 
 ,
( 1)
i
i
e
v m
n m
α −≥
−
 (4) 
where v, mi and me are defined in equation (1), and n is the number of subjects in the group.  If 
equation (4) does not hold, a subject will contribute nothing. Equation (4) makes apparent how 
changes in the experiment parameters will affect the level of contributions to the public good.  
For example, consider a decision in which a subject is paired with one other participant; if a 
token kept earns 5-cents, and the internal and external return are both 4-cents, then only those 
with an altruism parameter greater than 0.25 will contribute to the public good.  If we hold all 
parameters at these values, but increase the external return to 12-cents, those with an altruism 
parameter greater than 0.08 will contribute to the public good. Given that the altruism parameter 
differs across participants, we would expect to see more contributors (and therefore a higher 
level of contributions) as the external return to the public good increases.  In addition, by 
observing an individual’s contribution decisions across treatments, one can estimate an 
individual-level altruism parameter. Based on the example above, if one does not contribute 
when the external return is 4-cents but does contribute when the external return is 12-cents, we 
can infer that this subject’s linear altruism parameter is between 0.08 and 0.25. 
Even with no altruism, some investment in the public good may be observed if the net 
loss from investing a token is small.  This type of “noisy” decision-making also implies that we 
may observe the level of investment increasing as the internal return increases (thereby 
decreasing the net opportunity cost of the investment).9  We introduce this model formally using 
a logit probabilistic choice rule (See Anderson et al. 1998 and Goeree et al. 2002a, 2002b for 
details).  According to this specification, choice probabilities are given by 
                                                 
9 The opportunity cost of a contribution is the difference between the value of a token kept and the internal return to 
the person contributing a token. 
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where Xi represents the individual’s token endowment, xi is the number of tokens subject i 
contributes, U(xi) is defined by equations (1) and (3), μ is an noise parameter to be estimated, 
and the denominator ensures that the choice probabilities add up to 1.  This choice rule implies 
that the probability of choosing any given level of contribution is proportional to an exponential 
function of the expected utility associated with that level of contribution.  The noise 
parameter,μ , represents the sensitivity of choices to changes in utility. If μ  is very large, 
choices are close to random. If μ  is very small, one is very sensitive to changes in utility, so the 
optimal decision is very likely to be chosen. 
 In the absence of altruism ( 0α = ), utility in equation (4) is simply one’s own earnings.  
Therefore, the earnings-maximizing decision to contribute zero tokens is most likely to be 
chosen.  The presence of some noise ( 0μ > ) implies that positive contributions will be observed 
with some positive probability.  Moreover, the model predicts that contributions will be higher 
when the opportunity cost of a contribution is smaller.10  When there is some altruism ( 0α > ) 
positive contributions are more likely to be observed, with higher contributions more likely when 
the benefit to others is larger. 
The parameterization in (5), with Ui determined by linear altruism model in (3), can be 
used to estimate the effects of altruism and noise.  The probability that individual i contributes xi 
tokens is given by (5); assuming that decisions are independent, the likelihood function is given 
by the product of these choice probabilities.  Therefore the log likelihood can be expressed as 
 ln( ) ln( ( )),iiL P x=∑  (6) 
where P(xi) is given in equation (5).  Estimates of μ and iα can be obtained by maximizing the 
log-likelihood function with respect to these parameters.  We estimate a separate altruism 
parameter for each individual but constrain the error term (μ ) to be identical for all subjects. 
Based on the estimated altruism parameter and a specified level of significance, we 
classify subjects into one of three categories:  those with a positive altruism parameter that is 
                                                 
10 When this opportunity cost falls, the utility-loss from deviating from the optimal decision is smaller; therefore the 
optimal decision is less likely to be chosen. 
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significantly different than zero, those with a negative altruism parameter that is significantly 
different than zero, and those with an altruism parameter that is not significantly different than 
zero.  For the purposes of discussion, we use a 95% level of confidence for the altruism 
parameters to classify subjects into one of the three categories.  In our parametric models, we 
examine the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, using both a 10 and 1 percent test size 
to classify subjects.  For ease of exposition, we simply refer to subjects as having a positive, 
negative, or a “zero” altruism parameter.  There were 29 subjects who chose to contribute 0-
tokens in all decisions; these subjects have no variation in their decisions and altruism 
parameters could not be directly estimated for these subjects.  However, as described in the next 
section, we do incorporate the decisions of these subjects into our parametric analysis as well. 
Across both treatments, there are 27, 46, and 11 percent of subjects categorized as having 
a positive, zero and negative altruism parameter, respectively.11  There are 29 subjects (15% of 
the total sample) who acted as pure Nash players.  The only significant difference between the 
two treatments is for the proportion of subjects who are categorized as having a zero altruism 
parameter.  In the base treatment, 42% of subjects are classified as having a zero altruism 
parameter, while 54% of subjects are classified as such in the reverse-order treatment.12  There 
were no significant differences across treatments in the proportion of subjects placed in each of 
the remaining altruism categories, and this is robust to our decision about which confidence level 
is used to categorize the altruism parameters (99, 95, or 90 percent level).   
We use each of these measures from the context-free public goods experiment to predict 
the probability that a contribution is made to the naturally-occurring local public good.  These 
results are described below. 
 
IV. Testing for Altruism Spillovers 
In this section, we relate the decisions subjects made in the context-free experiments to 
their choices over whether or not to contribute to the naturally-occurring local public good.  
First, we briefly summarize the results of the choice experiments and provide an overview of the 
                                                 
11 If a 10% test size is used to categorize subjects, there are 32, 39, and 14 percent of subjects categorized as having 
a positive, zero and negative altruism parameter, respectively.  If instead a 1% test size is used is used to categorize 
subjects, there are 20, 65, and 0 percent of subjects categorized as having a positive, zero and negative altruism 
parameter, respectively 
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various measures of altruism and their relationship to the decision to purchase a tree.  Parametric 
models are then presented that provide a better understanding of the relationship between 
altruism in the context-free environment and altruism toward the naturally-occurring public 
good.   
 
 Altruism Measures and Choice Experiment Results 
Table 1 defines the variables used in our analysis, and Table 2 reports summary statistics 
for the altruism measures for each treatment.  The summary statistics for the non-parametric 
measures of altruism (avgcont, %strong, and %weak) are reported by altruism parameter 
category (altpos, altneg, altzero, altnash). 
There is a strong correlation between the estimated level of altruism and subjects’ 
average contribution in the context-free experiment. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.46, 
which is significantly different from zero at any standard level.  This correlation is reflected in 
the consistency between the average contribution and altruism parameter category reported in 
Table 2.  Average contributions are highest among those with positive altruism parameters and 
lowest for those with negative estimated altruism parameters. Because we define those subjects 
who never contribute as Nash players, by definition they will have the lowest average 
contribution (zero) of any altruism category.  Those with a positive altruism parameter 
contributed, on average, almost 60% of their tokens, compared with approximately 26 percent 
for those with a zero altruism parameter and just 3 to 5 percent for those with a negative altruism 
parameter. 
Figure 3 shows frequency histograms of the percent of the endowment contributed by 
each individual in each decision.13  Contributions by those with a positive altruism parameter 
(top panel of Figure 3) are more uniformly distributed than those with a zero or negative altruism 
parameter (see the middle and bottom panels of Figure 3, respectively).  In fact, the modal 
outcome (with over 19 percent of all contribution decisions) by those with a positive altruism 
parameter is to contribute over 95 percent of one’s endowment.  In contrast, only about 8 percent 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 If, instead, a 10% test size is used to categorize subjects, there are 36 and 44 percent of subjects categorized as 
having a zero altruism parameter, and these proportions are not significantly different from each other. 
13 The number of data points graphed in the histograms corresponds to the total number of decisions made by all 
subjects.  For example, if there are 10 subjects making 10 decisions, the histogram is comprised of 100 data points, 
each one representing the percentage of endowment contributed in a given decision. 
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of contribution decisions made by those with a zero altruism parameter exceed 55 percent of 
one’s endowment.  Those with negative altruism parameters appear very similar to Nash players.  
They contribute less than 5 percent of one’s endowment in 83 percent of all decisions and never 
contribute more than 50 percent of one’s endowment.  A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that 
the distribution of contributions is significantly different among those with positive, zero, and 
negative altruism parameters (p < 0.01). 
A consistent relationship is found between the parametric measure of altruism and the 
percent of rounds in which subjects are classified as a strong free-rider (%strong).  Subjects with 
a negative altruism parameter behaved as strong free-riders in at least 50% of rounds, on 
average, while subjects with positive altruism parameters only did so in approximately 7% of 
rounds.  The relationship between the sign of the altruism parameter and the number of rounds in 
which one is a weak free-rider is not as strong.  While subjects with a positive altruism parameter 
acted as weak free-riders in the fewest rounds (on average), there is little difference in the 
percentage of rounds in which subjects with negative altruism parameters acted as weak free-
riders as compared to subjects with a zero altruism parameter.  Those with a negative altruism 
parameter were much more likely to contribute nothing than those with a zero altruism 
parameter.  In contrast, those with a zero altruism parameter were much more likely to contribute 
more than 30 percent of their endowment than those with a negative altruism parameter.  
However, there is little difference between these two groups in the percentage of contributions 
that fall between zero and 30 percent of one’s endowment (i.e., behave as a weak free-rider). 
Turning to the decisions made in the choice experiment, across both treatments 77% of 
all subjects chose not to purchase a tree for Trees Atlanta in any of the eight choice questions.  
Of the 23% who chose to purchase a tree at least once, almost half chose a tree in just one of the 
eight questions.  Slightly fewer subjects chose a tree in the reverse-order treatment (19%) versus 
the base treatment (25%).  The difference in proportion choosing a tree across treatments is not 
statistically significant (Pearson Χ2 statistic p-value = 0.369).  Table 2 also reports the percentage 
of subjects within each altruism parameter category who chose a tree in at least one question.  
Surprisingly, Pearson Χ2 statistics indicate no significant differences in the percentage of 
subjects choosing a tree across any of the four altruism categories in the base or reverse-order 
treatments.  However, these non-parametric tests are not particularly informative because there is 
variation across subjects in the tree-types and costs presented to them (recall, there were four 
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different versions of the questionnaire administered to subjects).  Thus, we now turn to 
parametric tests that allow us to incorporate the features of the trees and their costs to understand 
better the relationship between the altruism parameter estimates and the likelihood that a subject 
chooses to have a tree planted. 
 
Parametric Analysis 
Conditional logit models (see McFadden 1974) are used to relate subjects’ choices to the 
characteristics of the trees presented, the tree costs, subjects’ earnings in the context-free 
experiments, and the various altruism measures computed for each subject in the context-free 
experiment.  Demographic variables are also included.  We include demographic characteristics 
that indicate a subject’s gender, ethnic background (Caucasian, Hispanic, African-American, and 
other), personal income, maritial status, whether or not raised in the U.S., whether or not 
employed, and whether or not personally responsible for tuition and expenses while in college.  
Also included are the student’s major (business, hard-sciences, other), the class standing 
(undergraduate versus graduate student), the number of economics courses taken, and a 
categorical variable indicating whether or not a subject reported typically favoring environmental 
preservation over development.  Given our design, there are 24 observations for each subject (8 
choice questions with 3 alternatives in each question), and the conditional logit model 
incorporates this structure of the data (see Greene 2003 or Wooldridge 2004 for standard 
introductions to the conditional logit model).   
Subjects in the base treatment completed the context-fee experiment before the naturally-
occurring contribution decision.  As such, there is a concern that one’s prior experience in the 
experiment may affect a subject’s contribution decision.  We control for this prior experience in 
two ways.  It is possible that subjects view their earnings from the context-free experiment as 
“found money,” and therefore they would be more likely to contribute than in the absence of 
these earnings.  We address this by including each subject’s total earnings from the context-free 
experiment in the regression analysis.  However, this does not explicitly address how differences 
in experiences among subjects may contribute to one’s contribution decision.  For example, a 
subject who contributed a lot relative to the others in one’s group in the context-free experiment 
may be less likely to contribute in a follow-up experiment.  We control for these differences in 
prior experience by including a second variable in the regression analysis: one’s own earnings 
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relative to the average earnings of all others in one’s group in the context-free experiment.  If one 
contributed more than the others in one’s group, this subject would have earned less than the 
others, and therefore this measure will be less than one.  On the other hand, if one contributed 
less than the others in one’s group, this measure will be greater than one. 
In addition to controlling for total and relative earnings, we conducted the reverse-order 
treatment in which a subject’s decision to contribute to a tree is not affected by any prior 
experience in an induced-value experiment.14  Because earnings (or relative earnings) would not 
affect contribution decisions of subjects in the reverse-order treatment, in the parametric analysis 
we interact both the earnings and relative earnings variables with a categorical variable equal to 
one if the experiment was the base treatment and equal to zero if the experiment was a reverse-
order treatment. 
Results from the parametric models are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  First, we briefly 
discuss the results for covariates related to the types of trees offered to subjects.  As all models in 
Table 3 and 4 indicate, the subjects were price-responsive.  The higher the price of a tree, the less 
likely it was to be chosen.  Oak trees (of either size) were more likely to be chosen as compared 
to small-crepe myrtle trees (the category left out of the models).  There was no significant 
difference between the likelihood of purchasing a dogwood (of any size) as compared to a small 
crepe myrtle, but larger crepe myrtles were preferred over small crepe myrtles.  These results are 
consistent with subjects having internalized the information provided during the discussion of the 
naturally occurring public good.  Recall, the issue presented to subjects was the loss of tree-cover 
in downtown Atlanta that helps to create an “urban heat island” effect, increasing temperatures 
due to loss of shade.  Oak trees provide the greatest shade potential (up to 70 feet at maturity) 
and the dogwood and crepe myrtle both provide relatively little shade potential (up to 20 feet at 
maturity). 
Although not reported for succinctness, demographic variables were generally 
significant.  All demographic variables are interacted with an attribute-specific constant 
indicating whether or not the subject chose either of the two trees (i.e., was “in the market” or 
not).  Briefly, the results were that older subjects and females were less likely to choose a tree.  
Caucasians were more likely to choose a tree, and African-Americans were less likely to choose 
                                                 
14 Subjects in the reverse-order treatment had not participated in any economics experiment previously. 
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a tree as compared to the base-category (which included Asian and other ethnic backgrounds).  
There was no significant difference between Hispanic students and the base category.  Graduate 
students (as compared to undergraduates) and subjects that were raised primarily outside the US 
were more likely to give to a tree.  Students majoring in hard-sciences were less likely to give to 
a tree as compared to any other major, although this was only significant in two of the four 
models estimated.  Whether or not a student was married, working, or responsible for their own 
tuition and books was not a significant predictor of whether or not they choose a tree, after 
controlling for the subject’s income.  Subjects with higher incomes (personal income, not 
laboratory earnings) were more likely to choose a tree, athough this was only significant in two 
of the four models.  Lastly, subjects who indicated they typically favor environmental 
preservation over development were significantly more likely to choose a tree in all four models. 
Table 3 reports models that include the non-parametric measures of altruism.  The 
variables related to altruism (avgcont, %weak, %strong) and earnings are interacted with an 
attribute-specific constant indicating whether or not the subject chose either of the two trees (i.e., 
was “in the market” or not).  Model 1 in Table 3 indicates that the average contributions of 
subjects are related to the decision of whether or not to purchase a tree.  The higher the average 
percentage of tokens contributed in the context-free experiments, the more likely a subject would 
choose to contribute to the naturally-occurring local public good.  However, this relationship is 
non-linear.  The likelihood that a subject contributes to Trees Atlanta increases at a decreasing 
rate as the percentage of tokens they contributed in the context-free experiments increases.  This 
relationship is consistent with the notion of altruism spillovers: people who behave altruistically 
in context-free, sterile laboratory environments that involve small benefits to few people (as 
measured by average token contributions) are also those who behave more altruistically in 
situations that involve benefits to the general public.  However, these results should be 
interpreted with caution because, as discussed earlier, the measure of “altruism” that we use here, 
an individual’s average contribution across all decisions (Avgcontr), is at best a rough proxy for 
altruism since it does not capture any differences in contributions between treatments 
In Model 2 we instead measure altruistic behavior using the percentage of rounds in 
which subjects were either strong or weak free-riders.  Results are presented in the last column of 
Table 3.  As expected, there is a negative correlation between the percent of rounds in which one 
is a strong free-rider (perfect Nash player) and the probability of purchasing a tree.  However, 
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there is a positive relationship between the percentage of rounds in which one is a weak free-
rider and the probability of purchasing a tree.  In other words, the more frequently a subject 
makes a low (but non-zero) contribution decision, the more likely one is to contribute to the 
naturally occurring public good.   
While the results for strong free-riders are consistent with our notion of altruism 
spillovers, the results for weak free-riders raise interesting questions.  One way to interpret these 
results comes when we classify subjects who are weak free-riders in most rounds as exhibiting 
behavior consistent with “warm-glow giving.”  When we look at the contribution decisions made 
by these subjects, we see that they contributed small amounts across decisions regardless of the 
external or internal return of the contribution or the number of subjects who benefit from their 
contribution.  In this context, Model 2 in Table 3 suggests that subjects who exhibit behavior 
more consistent with “warm-glow giving” in the laboratory (i.e., contribute small, positive 
amounts in more rounds) are also more likely to give to the naturally-occurring public good.  
This raises the question: are the contributions of these subjects to the naturally-occurring local 
public good an extension of their warm-glow behavior?  To examine this hypothesis more 
closely, we turn now to our parametric measure of altruism.  This parametric measure explicitly 
models the subject’s response to differences in the parameter values in the context-free 
experiments.  In this way we can more clearly distinguish those whose behavior is consistent 
with “altruism,” which is associated with positive contributions and responsiveness to external 
benefits to the pubic good, with those who are warm-glow givers.  
Table 4 reports four models in which the decision to purchase a tree is related to the 
subject’s estimated altruism parameter.  In model A, the estimated value of the subject’s altruism 
parameter is entered directly as an explanatory variable.  For this one regression we omit Nash 
players (those who never contributed in the laboratory experiment) because we were unable to 
estimate an altruism parameter for these subjects.  They are, however, included in all other 
regressions reported in Table 3 and 4.  Results suggest that the likelihood of choosing a tree 
increases as the subject’s altruism parameter increases.  While these results are supportive of 
altruism spillovers being present, the model does not distinguish between altruism parameters 
that are significantly different than zero and imposes a specific interpretation on the altruism 
parameters that may not be reasonable: that a subject with altparam=2 cares twice as much about 
others as a subject with altparam=1.  The next model we present considers these two aspects of 
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the data directly. 
Models B through D use categorizations of the subjects based on the sign and 
significance of their altruism coefficient.  The four categories are Nash players who contributed 
nothing in all decisions (Altnash), those with a statistically significant, positive altruism 
parameter (Altpos), those with a statistically significant, negative altruism parameter (Altneg), 
and those whose altruism parameter is not significantly different from zero (Altzero).  We test 
the robustness of our results by presenting estimation results using different cut-off values used 
to determine whether an altruism parameter is significantly different than zero.  Test sizes of 
10%, 5%, and 1% are used as the cut-off for Models B, C, and D, respectively.  If we use a 1% 
test size for categorizing the altruism parameters, there are no subjects who are categorized as 
having a negative altruism parameter (the largest z-statistic for those with a negative altruism 
parameter is 2.437 in absolute value), which is reflected in Model D having no entry for the 
coefficient estimate of altneg. 
Two findings emerge from these models.  First, supportive of the previous analyses, 
subjects who are strong free-riders. i.e., are pure Nash-players in all rounds. are significantly less 
likely to choose a tree in all models.  While this is consistent with the notion of altruism 
spillovers, the results for our other categories are less promising.  All models indicate that 
subjects who are estimated to have a positive altruism parameter are no more likely to choose a 
tree than subjects who are estimated to have a zero altruism parameter (the “warm glow givers”).  
In addition, if one is most generous about who is categorized as having a negative altruism 
parameter (i.e., use the 90% level of confidence to categorize subjects), then there is also no 
significant difference in the probability that a subject with a positive or zero altruism parameter 
chooses a tree when compared to those with a negative altruism parameter.  This latter result is 
sensitive to the cutoff-level for categorizing subjects.  If instead, a more stringent rule is applied 
(the 5% test size), the probability that a subject with a negative altruism parameter chooses a tree 
is not statistically different than subjects who are pure Nash players (see model C) and is 
statistically different than subjects with a positive or zero altruism parameter.15 
The results in Models B through D are consistent with our earlier hypothesis that subjects 
who act as warm-glow givers in the laboratory may extend that behavior to non-laboratory public 
                                                 
15 The coefficients for the positive and zero altruism parameter categories are significantly different than the 
coefficient for the negative altruism category at the 90% level of confidence only. 
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goods and that Nash players in the laboratory may also extend their non-altruistic behavior 
beyond the laboratory, thus indicating some degree of relationship between altruism in 
laboratory contexts and in naturally occurring contexts.  However, the results are also not wholly 
supportive of our notion of altruism spillovers.  Subjects who acted the most altruistically in the 
lab were no more likely to contribute to the naturally-occurring public good than the warm-glow 
givers or those who behaved ‘spitefully’ in the laboratory experiments (although this latter result 
is sensitive to choices made about the categorization of altruism parameters). 
 
VI. Summary 
Laboratory public-goods experiments have traditionally been used to study the question 
of whether altruism exists and the nature of altruism (e.g., warm glow versus pure altruism).  
However, most experiments are careful to use a neutral setting, even referring to the decision as 
an “investment” rather than a “contribution.”  Our results suggest that further investigation into 
the external validity of decisions made in these context-free situations is warranted.  
Results indicate that altruistic behavior in the lab can be predictive of contributions to 
naturally occurring public goods, but not in a uniform manner.  We observe a positive 
relationship between a crude measure of altruism (the average contributions to the laboratory 
public good across rounds) and the likelihood that a subject contributes to a naturally occurring 
public good.  In addition, the more often a subject behaves as a pure Nash player across rounds 
(i.e., contributes zero tokens to the laboratory public good), the less likely he is to contribute to a 
naturally-occurring public good.  However, contrary to expectations, acting as a weak free-rider 
more often in the induced-value public goods game increases the likelihood of contributing to 
the naturally occurring public good. 
Parametric estimates of altruism also do a poor job of predicting contributions to the 
naturally-occurring public good.  Subjects are categorized into four categories based on 
individual-level altruism parameter estimates: those who are Nash players and contribute nothing 
in all decisions, those with a statistically significant, positive altruism parameter, those with a 
statistically significant, negative altruism parameter, and those whose altruism parameter 
(positive or negative) is not significantly different from zero.  Supportive of the notion of 
altruism spillovers, we find that the pure Nash players are less likely to give to the naturally 
occurring public good.  However, we cannot distinguish between the contribution behavior 
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toward the naturally occurring public good of the other subjects based on whether they have a 
positive, negative, or “zero” altruism parameter with any degree of confidence. 
Overall, while our results indicate there is some relationship between altruism in 
laboratory games and altruism toward a naturally occurring public good, the relationship is far 
from being incontrovertible.  The question this naturally raises is whether subjects in the 
laboratory experiment view their investment decision as a contribution to a public good that 
benefits others (in this case, other participants) or as a different sort of game.  At the very least 
our results suggest that one should be cautious when using the results from laboratory public 
goods experiments to make inferences about altruism outside of the lab and that further testing of 
the notion of altruism spillovers is certainly warranted. 
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Table 1.  Variable Definitions 
 
Context-free Experiment Variables 
Avgcontr Average contributions of subject across decisions, measured as a percentage of 
their total endowment in each decision (see equation 2). 
%Strong Percentage of decisions in which the subject was a strong free-rider 
(contributed 0 tokens). 
%Weak Percentage of decisions in which the subject was a weak free-rider 
(contributed more than 0 tokens, but less than 30% of their endowment). 
Altparam Altruism parameter as estimated by equation 6. 
Altpos =1 if altruism parameter is positive and significantly different than zero (the 
level of significance will vary as noted in the text where appropriate), =0 
otherwise. 
Altzero =1 if the estimated altruism parameter is not significantly different than zero 
(the level of significance will vary as noted in the text where appropriate), =0 
otherwise. 
Altneg =1 if altruism parameter is negative and significantly different than zero (the 
level of significance will vary as noted in the text where appropriate), =0 
otherwise. 
Altnash =1 if subject contributed zero tokens in all rounds, =0 otherwise. 
Earnings Earnings of the subject in the context-free experiment. 
Relearn Earnings of the subject in the context-fee experiment relative to the other 
subjects in one’s decision-making group. 
Trees Atlanta Experiment Variables 
Price Price of the tree offered in the alternative. 
Oakmed =1 if the alternative was a medium-sized Oak tree, = 0 otherwise. 
Oaksm =1 if the alternative was a small-sized Oak tree, = 0 otherwise. 
Dogmed =1 if the alternative was a medium-sized Dogwood tree, = 0 otherwise. 
Dogsm =1 if the alternative was a small-sized Dogwood tree, = 0 otherwise. 
Crepemed =1 if the alternative was a medium-sized Crepe Myrtle tree, = 0 otherwise. 
Crepesm =1 if the alternative was a small-sized Crepe Myrtle tree, = 0 otherwise.  This 
is the category not included in the model. 
 
  
Table 2.  Contribution Characteristics by Altruism Parameter Category.1 
 
 Positive Altruism 
Parameter (altpos) 
Zero Altruism  
Parameter (altzero) 
Negative Altruism 
Parameter (altneg) 
Nash Players 
(altnash) 
 Base (N=37) 
Rev. Order 
(N=16) 
Base 
(N=52) 
Rev. Order 
(N=37) 
Base 
(N=14) 
Rev. Order 
(N=8) 
Base 
(N=22) 
Rev. Order 
(N=7) 
Average percentage 
contribution (avgcont) 
58.1 
(14.3) 
[35 – 92] 
56.8 
(16.7) 
[37 – 92] 
24.9 
(11.0) 
[7 – 46] 
27.5 
(12.5) 
[0.5 – 57] 
4.9 
(2.8) 
[2 - 11] 
2.7 
(2.5) 
[0.5 – 8] 
0.00 
(0.00) 
[NA] 
0.00 
(0.00) 
[NA] 
Strong free-riders 
(%strong) 
6.7 
(9.8) 
[0 - 30] 
7.8 
(12.4) 
[0 - 40] 
17.4 
(23.7) 
[0 - 90] 
12.8 
(20.8) 
[0 - 90] 
48.1 
(29.3) 
[0 - 90] 
73.9 
(28.0) 
[10 - 92] 
100 
(0.00) 
[NA] 
100 
(0.00) 
[NA] 
Weak free-riders 
(%weak) 
16.6 
(14.9) 
[0 – 50] 
17.2 
(16.9) 
[0 – 50] 
50.3 
(24.3) 
[0 – 100] 
49.3 
(28.4) 
[8 – 100] 
49.9 
(31.4) 
[0 – 100] 
23.9 
(29.4) 
[0 – 90] 
0.00 
(0.00) 
[NA] 
0.00 
(0.00) 
[NA] 
Number of subjects who chose 
a tree at least once 
8 
{22%} 
4 
{25%} 
15 
{29%} 
9 
{24%} 
3 
{21%} 
0 
{0%} 
5 
{23%} 
0 
{0%} 
Earnings $36.57 (5.53) 
$35.29 
(2.22) 
$39.42 
(8.09) 
$35.74 
(3.23) 
$41.41 
($9.78) 
$34.00 
($2.72) 
$36.34 
($6.56) 
$35.18 
($3.22) 
Relative Earnings (relearn) 
0.90 
(0.15) 
[0.5 – 1.1] 
1.00 
(0.06) 
[0.9 – 1.1] 
1.05 
(0.21) 
[0.7 – 1.9] 
1.01 
(0.10) 
[0.8 – 1.3] 
1.16 
(0.14) 
[1.0 – 1.5] 
0.96 
(0.08) 
[0.9 – 1.1] 
1.03 
(0.16) 
[0.6 – 1.4] 
0.99 
(0.10) 
[0.9 – 1.1] 
1 In parentheses is the standard deviation. In brackets is the range of outcomes, and in curly brackets is the percent of total subjects in 
each category (e.g., 19 percent of those with a positive altruism parameter chose a tree at least once).
Table 3.  Conditional logit models including non-parametric measures of contribution behavior 
in the context-free experiments.* 
 
 Model 1:  
Average Contributions 
Model 2:  
%Strong and %Weak 
 Coefficient 
(std. error) 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
Price -0.288a 
(0.045) 
-0.290a 
(0.045) 
Oakmed 2.148a 
(0.538) 
2.170a 
(0.546) 
Oaksm 0.642b 
(0.304) 
0.653b 
(0.308) 
Dogmed 1.063 
(0.679) 
1.060 
(0.685) 
Dogsm -0.110 
(0.332) 
-0.145 
(0.339) 
Crepemed 1.356b 
(0.675) 
1.361b 
(0.687) 
Earnings -0.281b 
(0.119) 
-0.289b 
(0.127) 
(Earnings)2 0.003b 
(0.001) 
0.003b 
(0.002) 
RelEarn 11.472b 
(4.700) 
12.060b 
(5.076) 
(RelEarn)2 -5.561b 
(2.325) 
-5.892b 
(2.522) 
AvgContr 0.007 a 
(0.012) 
 
(AvgContr)2 -0.001a 
(0.0001) 
 
%Strong  -0.029 a 
(0.011) 
(%Strong)2  0.0002 
(0.0001) 
%Weak  0.035 a 
(0.012) 
(%Weak)2  -0.003 b 
(0.0001) 
 N=4200  
(175 subjectsd) 
N=4200  
(175 subjectsd) 
 2
 Ln(L) = -427.32 Ln(L) = -421.66 
 Psuedo R2=0.7469 Psuedo R2=0.7503 
 
* Included in all models are a combined alternative-specific constant that is equal to one if the 
choice involved one of the two trees (i.e., the subject was “in the market”), and equal to zero if 
the choice involved neither tree (i.e., the subject was “out of the market”).  Earnings of the 
subject and the variables related to the subject’s estimated altruism parameter are interacted with 
this alternative-specific constant. 
a Coefficient significant at the 1% level of significance. 
b Coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance. 
c Coefficient significant at the 10% level of significance. 
d 18 subjects were dropped from this analysis because they did not answer some of the included 
demographic questions. 
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Table 4.  Conditional logit models including parametric measures of altruism in the context-free 
experiments *  
 
 Model A: 
Continuous Altruism 
Parameter, Nash 
Players Excluded 
Model B: 
Altruism Parameter 
Categories  
(10% level) 
Model C: 
Altruism Parameter 
Categories  
(5% level) 
Model D: 
Altruism Parameter 
Categories  
(1% level) 
 Coefficient 
(std. error) 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
Price -0.285a 
(0.046) 
-0.293a 
(0.045) 
-0.294a 
(0.045) 
-0.291a 
(0.045) 
Oakmed 2.176a 
(0.552) 
2.158a 
(0.536) 
2.172a 
(0.537) 
2.151a 
(0.533) 
Oaksm 0.666b 
(0.322) 
0.655b 
(0.308) 
0.654b 
(0.309) 
0.651b 
(0.308) 
Dogmed 1.107 
(0.691) 
1.088 
(0.677) 
1.092 
(0.677) 
1.074 
(0.675) 
Dogsm -0.010 
(0.347) 
-0.094 
(0.338) 
-0.105 
(0.338) 
-0.092 
(0.335) 
Crepemed 1.376b 
(0.694) 
1.381b 
(0.678) 
1.382b 
(0.680) 
1.373b 
(0.675) 
Earnings -0.332a 
(0.101) 
-0.328a 
(0.118) 
-0.333a 
(0.119) 
-0.371a 
(0.113) 
(Earnings)2 0.004a 
(0.001) 
0.004a 
(0.001 
0.004a 
(0.001) 
0.004a 
(0.001) 
Relearn 13.077a 
(3.757) 
13.821a 
(4.551) 
13.816a 
(4.556) 
15.308a 
(4.421) 
(Relearn)2 -5.843a 
(1.716) 
-6.532a 
(2.197) 
-6.469a 
(2.179) 
-7.262a 
(2.137) 
Altparam 0.674c 
(0.364) 
   
(Altparam)2 -0.538 
(0.394) 
   
Altpos  
 
1.678a 
(0.487) 
1.708a 
(0.490) 
1.882a 
(0.515) 
Altzero  
 
1.874a 
(0.482) 
1.811a 
(0.479) 
1.690a 
(0.472) 
Altneg  
 
1.180c 
(0.614) 
0.877 
(0.647) 
 
 N=3600  
(150 subjects)d 
N=4200  
(175 subjects)d 
N=4200  
(175 subjects)d 
N=4200  
(175 subjects)d 
 4
 Ln(L) = -385.09 Ln(L) = -412.49 Ln(L) = -428.33 Ln(L) = -428.33 
 Psuedo R2=0.7232 Psuedo R2=0.7557 Psuedo R2=0.7463 Psuedo R2=0.7463 
 
* Included in all models are a combined alternative-specific constant that is equal to one if the 
choice involved one of the two trees (i.e., the subject was “in the market”), and equal to zero if 
the choice involved neither tree (i.e., the subject was “out of the market”).  Earnings of the 
subject and the variables related to the subject’s estimated altruism parameter are interacted with 
this alternative-specific constant. 
a Coefficient significant at the 1% level of significance. 
b Coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance. 
c Coefficient significant at the 10% level of significance. 
d 18 subjects were dropped from this analysis because they did not answer some of the included 
demographic questions. 
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Figure 1. Average Individual Contribution Over All Decisions 
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Figure 2. Free-Riding Behavior 
(a) Percent of Decisions in which an Individual Contributes Nothing 
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(b) Percent of Decisions in which an Individual Contributes a Positive Amount, But Less than 30 
Percent of the Endowment 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Endowment Contributed in Each Decision 
(a) Contributions by Individuals with Positive Altruism Parameters 
0-5 6-15
16-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
66-75
76-85
86-95
96-100
Percent of Endowment Contributed
0
20
40
60
80
100
Relative Frequency
 
(b) Contributions by Individuals with Zero Altruism Parameters 
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(c) Contributions by Individuals with Negative Altruism Parameters 
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